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Formalities and Formalism: A
Critical Look at the
Execution of Wills
CHARLES I. NELSON*
JEANNE M. STARCK**
It has been stated, with force and clarity, that "[olne funda-
mental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the
individualistic institution of private property and granting to the
owner the power to determine his successors in ownership, the
general philosophy of the courts should favor giving effect to an
intentional exercise of that power."' One cannot, however, read
the cases at any length without beginning to sense the struggle
which goes on in the courts between the desire to give effect to
the manifest intent of the testator and the hesitancy to do so be-
cause of formalities requirements imposed by statute.2 It is the
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** Third Year Student, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A., The Uni-
versity of California, Irvine.
1. Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1941) [hereinafter cited as Gulliver].
2. An excellent example of this struggle and the tension which it creates may
be found in the English case In Re Graffman, [19681 1 W.L.R. 733 (C.A.), in which
tension of that struggle which will be examined along with the
methods which are currently proposed to deal with it. Thereafter,
a statute will be proposed which will implement the purposive
needs of the state for judicial implementation of a testator's
wishes while reducing the burden upon both the courts and the
testator for literal compliance.
One of Justice Holmes' famous aphorisms was that "upon this
point, a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 3 Understand-
ing the development and current attitude toward formalities re-
quirements necessitates several pages of history.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMALITIES
Pre-1677
The origin of the modern will has commanded the interest of
many talented and tenacious writers. 4 It is generally propounded
that the genesis of the modern will is Rome.5 However, the for-
malities attendant to ancient Roman devolution of property, often
referred to as the "copper and scales," 6 bear little relation to mod-
the judge, after stating "I am perfectly satisfied that the document was intended
by the deceased to be executed as his will and that its contents represent his tes-
tamentary intentions.", nevertheless went on to hold that there had not been lit-
eral compliance with the statute and thus denied probate to the will.
3. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
4. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 267-77 (M. Howe ed. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as HOLMES]; H.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 166-209 (10th ed. 1884) [hereinafter
cited as MAINE]; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, THE LAW OF WILLS 2-9 (1928) [hereinaf-
ter cited as REPPY & TOMPKINS]; W. ROLLISON, THE LAW OF WILLS 41 (1939) [here-
inafter cited as ROLLiSON]; J. WILLIAMS, WILLS AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION 2-9
(1891) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS]; Bigelow, Theory of Post-Mortem Disposi-
tion: The Rise of the English Will, 11 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1897) [hereinafter cited as
Bigelow]; Gross, The Medieval Law of Intestacy, 18 HARV. L. REV. 120 (1904) [here-
inafter cited as Gross]; On the Origin and History of Wills, 1 LEGAL REP. 223
(1841).
5. Whether the idea of the will existed among any of the Germanic tribes
which later invaded England or whether it was adopted from Roman law, by the
eighth century, English law was familiar with an instrument which was executed
in anticipation of death and which altered the course of descent. W. BowE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 2.7 (1960) [hereinafter BOWE & PARKER]. See also T. AT-
KINSON, LAW OF WILLS 6-10 (1953) [hereinafter cited as ATKINSON]; MAINE, supra
note 4, at 190-91; REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 4, at 3; HOLMES, supra note 4, at
270, Bigelow, supra note 4, at 78-79.
6. Originally the testament 'with the copper and the scales' was in form
and in effect a sale by the owner to his intended successor in the presence
of five witnesses and a balance holder to weight the price paid by the
guarantee to the grantor ... the transfer took effect immediately and not
on the owner's death. In addition, the features of revocability and secrecy
were not present . . . about the only feature of the original testament
'with the copper and the scales' which has been preserved is that of the
seven witnesses who in latter times were required to sign and seal the in-
strument. (Footnotes omitted).
ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 8-9. See also, BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.5;
MAINE, supra note 4, at 198-202.
[Vol. 6: 331, 19791 Formalities and Formalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ern will formalities. Insight to current will requisites is afforded
by a review of the English laws of succession, commencing with
the year 1066, when Willy killed Harry.7
The Norman Conquest brought both Willy to the throne and
feudalism to England.8 Prior to that time, both real and personal
property had been freely willed.9 With few exceptions,10 land
could not be devised under the feudal system.ll This restriction
against devising land, coupled with primogeniture, 12 assured the
lords of loyal subjects necessary to the military aspect of feudal-
ism.13 Additionally, land could only be alienated by livery of sei-
sin, a ritual one was hard put to perform once one was dead.14
7. "Willy killed Harry-1066" is our method of remembering the Battle of
Hastings wherein William the Conqueror of Normandy dethroned Harold with one
optically placed arrow, a point of reference well established during eigth grade his-
tory and heartily recommended to those with a penchant for forgetting trivia.
8. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.3 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as AMERICAN LAW OF PROP.].
9. WiLLIAms, supra note 4, at 2; REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 4, at 56; BOWE
& PARKER, supra note 5, at §§ 2.7, 2.16; ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 11-12.
Willed is the verb now commonly employed to indicate succession of both real
and personal property. Formerly the term 'willed' related only to real property,
'testament' referencing personalty. Likewise, a distinction was made between the
'devise' of land and the 'bequest' of personalty. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 36.
See also, the preamble to the Statute of Wills of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict, c.26 (1837).
[TI he word 'will' shall extend to a testament,. .. "
10. Certain boroughs retained the pre-Conquest custom of devising real prop-
erty despite the establishment of the feudal system. See Gross, supra note 4, at
129-30; WiuIAL s, supra note 4, at 10-11, BowE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.11.
11. See supra, note 5, ATKINSON at 13-14, and BOWE & PARKER at § 2.9.
12. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 78; Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Free-
dom in England, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 340 (1940). For a detailed history of primo-
geniture, see MAINE, supra note 4, at 218-36.
13. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.9; MAINE, supra note 4, at 225.
14. Analytically, this process [livery of seisin] is twofold. The present
possessor vacates possession, indicating to the intending acquirer that
he (the purchaser) may take peaceful possession of the land so left va-
cant. Thereupon, the purchaser enters and takes possession of the land.
Usually, however, the process is effected by a single ceremony which dis-
guises the dual character of the transaction ('livery in law'). It is possible,
however, that a considerable interval may elapse between the retirement
of the transferor and the entry of the transferee. In that case, until the
latter event has taken place, the delivery of possession is imperfect ('liv-
ery in law'). In any case, it is essential to the transaction that the posses-
sion shall be vacant when the transferee enters; otherwise his act is a
disseisin, it may be a forcible disseisin, which will subject him to criminal
punishment. That is why entry must take place in the lifetime of the
feoffor; before the latter's seisin descends to his heir in pursuance of the
rule: le mort saisit le rif. During the whole of the period under review, no
written evidence of the feoffment was required; though for convenience of
record, 'charters of feoffment' became common before the end of the
fifteenth century. But the form of such documents tells its own tale. It is
Unhappy with the inequitable effects of primogeniture, 15 chi-
canery was employed to devise one's real property. Under the
protection of the Chancery,16 the use became the common vehicle
by which one was able to devise his real property despite the pro-
hibition against alienation by will.' 7 Albert would convey his
property to Bert for the use of Calvin; Calvin would assume phys-
ical possession and an equitable interest while Bert would have
mere legal title. Should Bert prove to be a bad actor and use the
property to the derogation of Calvin's equitable interest, the
Chancery would enforce the use against all but a bona fide pur-
chaser.'8
This mode of succession continued from the late eleventh cen-
tury' 9 until the passage of the Statute of Uses in 1535.20 The Stat-
ute of Uses was a result of King Henry VIII's realization that his
coffers were nearing depletion and the use was effectively depriv-
ing him of the incidents of tenure, a previously reliable source of
revenue. 2' The Statute of Uses merged the legal estate held by
the feofee with the equitable estate of the cestui que use into one
legal estate held by the beneficiary of the use.22 The only ar-
rangements affected were those wherein the equitable estate of
enjoyment and possession was separate from the legal estate of
title. 23 It did not apply to leaseholds24 and the use was not totally
abolished.25
The significance of the Statute of Uses for the formalities of the
modern will is that it served as the impetus26 to the creation of
the Statute of Wills of 1540.27 The Statute of Uses practically and
recitative only, not operative-'I have given and granted,' not, 'I give and
grant.' /
E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLSH LAW 106-07 (1912) [hereinafter cited as
JENKS]. See also, AMERICAN LAW OF PROP., supra note 8, at § 1.6; Bow /& PARKER,
supra note 5, at § 2.9; ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 8; RoLusON, supra noe 4, at § 43.
15. Primogeniture imposed an inequality upon the distribution df one's pos-
sessions among those natural subjects of generosity. Bigelow, supranote 4, at 78.
16. For jurisdiction of the Chancery, see Atkinson, English Testamentary
Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1943).
17. Sweet, 'A Song of Uses. Some Reflections and a Moral, 35 L.Q. REv. 127
(1919).
18. See, generally, AMERICAN LAw OF PROP. supra note 8, at §§ 1.17-1.21; IV W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 421-50 (2d ed. 1973), [hereinafter cited
as HOLDSWORTH]; BowE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.12.
19. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 415.
20. Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Henry 7, c. 10. (1535). For pertinent text, see
AMERICAN LAw OF PROP., supra note 8, at § 1.25.
21. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 450.
22. Id. at 461-63.
23. Id. at 463.
24. Id. See also, AMERICAN LAw OF PROP., supra note 8, at § 1.28.
25. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 463.
26. Id. at 464-65.
27. Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Henry 8 c. 1 (1540).
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legally made it impossible to devise real property.28 The Statute
of Uses never represented popular desires and its stormy legisla-
tive history29 indicates that it was more a means of accumulating
revenue than a concerted structuring of the property system. In
contrast, the Statute of Wills of 1540 represented the overwhelm-
ing desire of the populace to have the freedom to devise their
property. 30
One of King Henry VIII's concerns prior to the Statute of Uses
was the chaotic state of land titles. 31 Coupled with the use, the
absence of recording requirements effectively made it impossible
to determine from public records who owned what.32 A compan-
ion act to the Statute of Uses, the Statute of Enrolments, 33 was
passed to require recordation of land conveyances. This statute
was not, however, the best alternative proposed and it too suf-
fered from the stormy politics of the time.34
Under the Statute of Wills of 154035 one was able to devise real
28. HoLDswoR, supra note 18, at 464; BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.13.
29. See, generally, HOLDswoRTH, supra note 18, at 449-61; AMERICAN LAW OF
PROp., supra note 8, at §§ 1.23, 1.24.
30. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 2.14; AMERICAN LAW OF PROP., supra
note 8, at § 1.33.
31. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 450.
32. Id. at 444-45.
33. Statute of Uses, (1535), 27 Henry 8 c. 16.
[It] provides that from the last day of July, no bargains and sales of es-
tates of freehold or inheritance shall be valid, unless made in writing and
under seal, and enrolled within six months of the date of the deed either
in one of the king's courts of Record at Westminster, or in the county
where the lands are situate.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 462.
34. The draft bill concerning the enrolment of convenants, contracts, bar-
gains, or agreements made with reference to the use of lands . . . pro-
posed to enact that the use of lands should not pass nor be created by
reason of "any recoveries, fines, feoffments, gifts, grants, convenants, con-
tracts, bargains, agreements, or otherwise, unless declared by writing
under seal and enrolled as provided by the Act. Further, it provided that,
for the future, all evidences of any kind should be enrolled ....
This is a remarkably comprehensive scheme for the registration of con-
veyances; and, if it had been passed and efficiently carried out, we should
have today, in working order, a series of country registers, which would
have considerably simplified the land law.
Id. at 457-59. The proposed draft provided for a Clerk of Enrolments in each shire
authorized to take acknowledgements and enroll evidences; they would also have
been required to take an oath to act honestly. The draft additionally provided for
a cross reference system between the document and the rolls. For a more specific
description of the draft, see id., at 458-59.
35. 32 Henry 8 c. 1 (1540).
property in writing. 36 This writing was considered a conveyance
of the land and evidenced the transfer of ownership.37 It is for
this reason that a will did not pass after-acquired real property; to
do so required making a new will.38 It was not uncommon for one
to make several wills, one for each new acquisition of real prop-
erty. This was also the case when property once willed was con-
veyed and later reacquired; a new will had to be made after the
reacquisition.39
The Statute of Wills of 1540 only applied to real property; nun-
cupative testaments of personal property continued to be effec-
tive.40 The Statute was so broad it allowed persons lacking in
capacity to dispose of real property, a defect soon remedied.4 1
The writing requirement was not needed to provide evidence of
the testator's intent, but to evidence the conveyance. Conse-
quently, the Statute did not require that the writing be in the
hand of the testator nor that it be signed by him. 42 Thus, it can be
seen that the purposes underlying the writing requirement of the
Statute of Wills of 1540 had little in common with those allegedly
36. As pertains to all lands except those held of the King by knights' service:
"That all and every person shall have full and free liberty, power and authority to
give, dispose, will and devise, as well as by his last will and testament in writing,
... all his said manors..." Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Henry 8, c. 1, §§ I (4) and II
(1540). See also, HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 465.
As pertains to lands held of the.King's highness in chief by Knights serv-
ice, or of the nature of Knights service in chief. . . shall have full power
and authority, by his last will, by writing . . . to give, dispose, will or as-
sign two parts of the same manors ... to and for the advancement of his
wife, preferment of his children and payment of his debts, or otherwise at
his will and pleasure; ....
Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Henry 8, c. 1 (1540) § IV. Devises of lands held in Knights
service were thereby restricted to two-thirds. This distinction was abolished along
with military tenures by the Tenures Abolition Act, 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660). See
also JENKS, supra note 14, at 104-05 and 241-44 and AMERICAN LAW OF PROP., supra
note 8, at § 1.35.
37. The aim of the Statute of Wills of 1540 was to partially restore that
power of testation which the Statute of Uses had taken away; and the
width of the clause which conferred the power of testation did, in fact,
give to testators all, and more than all, the freedom to mould the disposi-
tion of their lands, which they had formerly enjoyed through the machin-
ery of the flexible use. It was only natural, therefore, that the lawyers and
landowners alike should have come to the conclusion that the will of
lands, made by virtue of the Act, was a transaction of a kind essentially
similar to a will of lands made through the machinery of the use. Like it,
it did not take effect till death; and, like it, it was essentially a conveyance
of the whole or part of the estate belonging to the testator when it was
maple. (Footnotes omitted).
HoLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 364-65.
38. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 18, at 364-66.
39. Id. at 366.
40. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 18.
41. 34, 35 Henry 8, c. 5 (1542-1543). HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 466; BowE &
Parker, supra note 5, at § 2.11 n.2.
42. HoLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 367-68.
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furthered by modern will formalities, 43 but the writing require-
ment did evidence a land transaction, much in the manner of our
modern recording system.
The Statute of Frauds of 167744
It is helpful to recapitulize the mode of making wills and testa-
ments4 5 prevalent before the enactment of the Statute of Frauds.
Only devises of land needed to be written. Such devises were not
required to be in the testator's hand nor signed by him; nor need
he have read the writing for it to be of effect. 46 With little excep-
tion, personalty passed by nuncupative will, the written form be,
ing undesirable due to the widely held superstition that death
rapidly followed the making of one's will.47
The Statute of Frauds is considered the precursor of modern
will formalities. 48 Sections V, VI, XIX, and XXII of the Statute
provided for formalities, many of which are still required in the
United States. A review of each section proves helpful before an-
alyzing the history leading to the enactment of the Statute.
Section V applied only to land and required all devises to be in
writing and signed49 by the devisor or another in his presence and
at his express direction. Such devises were also to be attested
and subscribed in the devisor's presence by at least three wit-
nesses. Absent compliance with these requirements, a devise
would be void.5o
Section VI also applied only to realty and provided that the rev-
43. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
44. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1676-77). For a discussion of the
theory that the Statute of Frauds was actually enacted in 1676, see Schouler, The
Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 18 AM. L. REV. 442-43 (1884) [hereinafter cited
as Schouler].
45. See note 9, supra.
46. VII W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 368 (2d ed.).
47. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 539 (5th ed. 2d impression
1973).
48. AMERICAN LAW OF PROP. supra, note 8, at § 1.36; BOWE & PARKER, supra
note 5, at §§ 2.18, 19.2.
49. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §V. (1676-1677).
50. All devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, deviseable either
by force of the Statute of Wills, or by this statute, or by force of the cus-
tom of Kent, or the custom of any borough, so devising the same, or by
some other person in his presence and by his express directions, and shall
be attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor by three or
four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none ef-
fect.
Id. at § V.
ocation of a devise was to be in writing or by destruction by the
devisor or another in his presence and at his direction.51
Section XIX related to nuncupative wills of more than thirty
pounds. Such wills were only valid when made by a testator in
extremis at his residence of the previous ten days, excepting the
residence requirement for those taken ill by surprise while away
from home. Additionally, such wills were to be proved by three
witnesses who were present at the making of the will and bore
witness thereto at the request of the testator.52
Section XXII provided that a written wi1153 of personalty could
only be revoked by a writing witnessed by three persons. 54
Sections XIX and XXII must be read conjunctively to assess
their full impact. Section XIX, XX and XXI made it practically
impossible to make an oral will. Section XXII required essen-
tially the same requirements for revocation of a written will of
personalty as for one of realty. The effect of these sections was to
require a writing for wills of personalty without the formalities re-
quired for wills of realty.
Exactly which single incident provided the impetus for the cre-
ation of the Statute of Frauds is hard to ascertain and, likewise, is
of dubious existence given the many areas of the law which the
Statute affected.5 5 However, at least two authors attribute the
51. No devise in writing of lands, tenements or hereditaments, nor any
clause thereof, shall at any time after the said four and twentieth day of
June be revocable, otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing,
or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, cancelling, tearing or
obliterating the same by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his
directions and consent.
Id.
52. No nuncupative will shall be good, where the estate thereby be-
queathed shall exceed the value of thirty pounds, that is not proved by the
oaths of three witnesses (at the least) that were present at the making
thereof; (3) nor unless it be proved that the testator at the time of pro-
nouncing the same, did bid the persons present, or some of them, bear
witness that such was his will, or to that effect; (4) nor unless such nuncu-
pative will were made in the time of the last sickness of the deceased, and
in the house of his or her habitation or dwelling, or where he or she hath
been resident for the space of ten days or more next before the making of
such will, except where such person was surprised or taken sick, being
from his own home, and dies before he returned to the place of his or her
dwelling; ....
Id. at § XIX.
53. See note 9, supra for distinction between a will and a testament.
54. And be it further enacted, that no will in writing concerning any goods or
chattels, or personal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause, devise or be-
quest therein, be altered or changed by any words, or will by word of mouth only,
except the same be in the life of the testator commited to writing, and after the
writing thereof read unto the testator, and allowed by him and proved to be so
done by three witnesses at the least. Statute of Frauds, 1677 29 Car. 2 c. 3, § XXII
(1676-1677).
55. VI W. HoLDSWORTH, A I-IISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 184-87(2d ed)
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Statute's provisions relating to wills to the almost successful
fraud revealed in Cole v. Mordaunt.56 In that case, a young wife
almost successfully perpetrated a fraud against the beneficiaries
of her elderly husband's written will. Nine witnesses testified to
the veracity of her husband's nuncupative will, which supposedly
left everything to his wife, and the revocation of his prior written
will. Only on appeal to the delegates were the fraud and perjury
revealed. In writing the opinion, Chancellor Nottingham ex-
pressed hope that Parliament would soon see fit to enact legisla-
tion to prevent such evils.5 7 It is significant that Nottingham has
been credited as one of the major authors of the Statute of
Frauds.5 8
Holdsworth5 9 views the inducement for, and subsequent enact-
ment of, the Statute of Frauds as a more functional result of the
transitory state of trial by jury during the latter half of the seven-
teenth century. Methods of controlling a jury were few or nonex-
istant, since juries were still prone to deciding cases based upon
their own knowledge, "and the modern device of getting an order
for a new trial, when the verdict was clearly against the weight of
the evidence, was in its infancy." 60 A new rule of parol evidence,
not as yet certain, was emerging. The parties most likely to know
the true situation, however, were often considered incompetent to
testify.6 1 The Statute of Frauds made "certain kinds of evidence
necessary for the proof of certain transactions,"62 and thereby
provided some degree of uniformity in the proving of wills.
While the preamble to the Statute espoused the hope that the
Statute would prevent fraud and perjury, in actuality it did little
more than avoid blanket assertions of nuncupative wills as exem-
plified by Cole v. Mordaunt.63 And, as early as 1757, Lord Mans-
56. ROLLISON, supra note 4, at 88; J. ROOD, WiLLs 218 (1926) [hereinafter cited
as ROOD].
57. RoOD, supra note 56.
58. Schouler, supra note 44.
59. See supra note 55, 388-89.
60. Id. at 388. Holdsworth continues: "Neither the parties to an action, nor
their husbands or wives, nor any persons who had any interest in the result of the
litgation, were competent witnesses. . . these rules were capable of working grave
injustice. (footnote omitted). The attestation of Wills Act, 1752 Geo. 2, c. 6 (1752)
provided that witnesses to a will which included a devise or bequest to the wit-
nesses were competent to testify but that the devise or bequest would be null and
void. This policy survives in many states. Id.
61. See supra note 55, at 388-89.
62. Id. at 388.
63. The Statute of Frauds "does not preclude the risk of forgery or perjury; it
field in Windham v. Chetwyn recognized the capability of the
Statute to defeat honest wills for lack of formalities.
I am persuaded many more fair wills have been overturned for want of
form, than fraudulent have been prevented by introducing it. I have had a
good deal of experience at the delegates; and hardly recollect a case of a
forged or fraudulent will, where it has not been solemnly attested. It is
clear that judges should lean against objections to the formality. They
have always done so, in every construction upon the words of the statute
• . . And still more ought they to do so, if that system would spread a
snare, in which many honest wills must unavoidably be entangled.
6 4
Despite the fact that the Statute was not capable of preventing
all fraud, it was not without merit. Holdsworth admitted it "did go
some way to meet the evil consequences of defective condition
both of the system of trial by jury, and of the law of evidence." 65
It lifted the proof of testaments from the level of mere conjecture
by requiring a writing and witnesses, two formalities which con-
tinue to survive in all of the states.66
Statute of Wills, 183767
Since the Statute of Frauds made it practically impossible to
make a verbal will, written wills of real and personal property
came into general use; nuncupative wills became rare. 68 The
problems next presented to the courts were not fraudulent asser-
tions of oral wills, but cases wherein the formalities of the Statute
of Frauds were not met. Then, as now, hard cases made bad law,
and the bad law resulting from the judges' reluctance to find true
wills void for want of compliance with the requisites of the Stat-
ute of Frauds prompted by the Statute of Wills of 1837.69
In White v. Trustees of the British Museum70 the issue was
whether or not the witnesses had attested the will of William
White as required by the Statute of Frauds.7 1 Only one of the wit-
nesses knew the writing to be the will of White and had wit-
does ensure that some evidence of these transactions is submitted to the court;
and it thereby renders the prosecution of wholly baseless claims more difficult."
See supra note 55, at 389.
64. Id. at 394-95. The contrary opinions of Lords Kenyon and Mansfield are
also set forth therein.
65. Id. at 390.
66. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
67. Statute of Wills, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26 (1837). "It is an 'Act for the
Amendment of the Laws with respect to Wills,' not an original Act, but to amend
the law, and was intended to remove all doubt and latitude of interpretation."
(Footnote omitted). E. EDWARDS, THE NEW STATUTE OF WILLS, 1 Victoria, C. 26, 2
(1846). [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS I .
68. H. SUGDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF WILLS AS ALTERED BY THE 1 VICTO-
RIA, c. 26, 181 (1837) [hereinafter cited as SUGDEN].
69. EDWARDS, supra note 67.
70. 130 Eng. Rep. 1299, 6 Bing 310 (1829).
71. "[T]he identity of the instrument is beyond dispute." Id. at 319.
[Vol. 6: 331, 1979] Formalities and Formalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
nessed the acknowledgment of the testator's signature as we now
know it to be, that is, a verbal acknowledgment that the signed
name was the testator's own and in his hand or the hand of an-
other at his direction. The remaining two witnesses did not know
the character of the writing nor did White verbally acknowledge
his signature. The jury had found by special verdict that the will
was the true will of William White and it is most likely this fact
which most influenced the court in its decision. The court held
that the testator had impliedly acknowledged the will merely by
requesting that the witnesses sign the writing, and that this was
within the Statute of Frauds. 72
Cases such as White73 effectively abrogated the formalities re-
quired by the Statute of Frauds which purportedly were designed
to prevent fraud and perjury.74 Under the holding in White,
whenever a testator requested a person to witness a paper, an im-
plied acknowledgement could be inferred. However, the paper
may have been blank, or any number of irregularities could 'have
been present, and the witness would be incapable of testifying on
these matters. Were the procedure in White to become custom-
ary, a witness could only offer testimony as to whether or not the
signature on the document was his own. No certainty as to the
witness' ability to testify upon the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will by the testator would exist. Presented with
the fact that the formalities required by the Statute of Frauds had
become meaningless at the pens of the judges, a commission was
formed to study the law of wills as they then existed and to make
recommendations thereon.75
72. [W Ie think the testator did acknowledge in fact, though not in words,
to the three witnesses, that the will was his. . . yet as the law is now fully
settled, that the testator need not sign his name in the presence of the
witnesses, but that a bare acknowledgement of his handwriting is a suffi-
cient signature to make their attestation and subscription good within the
statute, though such acknowledgement conveys no intimation whatever,
or means of knowledge, either of the nature of the instrument, or the ob-
ject of the signing; we think the facts of the present case place the testator
and the witnesses in the same situation as they stood where such oral ac-
knowledgement of signature has been made, and we do therefore, upon
the principle of those decisions, hold the execution of the will in question
to be good within the statute.
Id. at 320.
73. SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 183.
74. "Here there was an acknowledgement to one of the witnesses; but to hold
that sufficient would be to repeal the statute... 130 Eng. Rep. 1299, 1302, 6 Bing
310, 316 (1829) (Adams Serjt., contra.).
75. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
The Commission,76 after expounding upon the desirability of
witnesses to wills, 77 recommended that only two witnesses to a
will be required 7 8 instead of the three required by the Statute of
Frauds. It further recommended that the witnesses attest the will
in the presence of each other,79 that no form be required for attes-
tation,80 and that witnesses be considered competent to attest a
will if they were competent at the time of the execution and not
76. For extracts of the report of the Fourth Real Property Commission, 1833,
see SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 177.
77. [A] will does not appear until after death of the only person who is
necessarily aware of its existence; it may by possibility have been exe-
cuted at any time during the life of the testator that a fabricator may think
it most safe to fix upon, and it usually disposes of the whole property of
the testator. Forgery is not the only, nor by much the most usual, ques-
tion affecting the validity of a will. The incapacity of the testator, or the
circumstances of fraud or coercion under which a false will may have
been obtained, and which may be attempted to be disproved by perjury,
render the validity of a will one of the most complicated and perplexing
subjects of litigation, and make it particularly necessary to require the
protection of attesting witnesses.
SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 179.
78. These considerations induce us to recommend that every will shall be
attested, and we think it expedient and sufficient to require two wit-
nesses .... The protection against forgery is greatly increased by requir-
ing a second witness, on account of the difficulty of engaging an
accomplice, the necessity of rewarding him, and the danger to be appre-
hended from his giving information, or not being able to elude a discovery
of the fraud by a searching cross-examination. We think it expedient not
to require more than two witnesses but of course the number should not
be restricted.
Id. at 180.
79. We therefore propose that every will should be signed by the testator
in the presence of, or the signature acknowledged to, two witnesses pres-
ent at one time and that they should subscribe their names in the pres-
ence of each other, or that one, having signed first, should acknowledge
his signature, and be present when the attestation is signed by the other.
We do not think it necessary to continue the provision of the Statute of
Frauds, which requires that the witnesses should subscribe in the pres-
ence of the testator. This, as we have stated, has been disregarded so far
that the courts have not required that the testator should actually see the
witnesses sign, but have considered it sufficient if he might see them;...
But if it be required that both witnesses shall be present at the time when
the will is signed or acknowledged, and shall attest it, in the presence of
each other, the signature of the witnesses will usually be made either in
the presence of the testator, or before they lose sight of the wills . . . It
does not appear to us that the additional security which may be obtained
by requiring the witnesses to sign in the testator's presence, is of so much
importance as the burthen and danger of imposing such a restriction.
Id. at 183-84. Note, the last sentence quoted above demonstrates a concern of the
Commission that wills truly representing a testator's wishes may be defeated for
want of formalities, a result contrary to the underlying purposes of the freedom of
testamentary disposition. The recommendation of the Commission that the re-
quirement of the Statutue of Frauds that the witnesses sign in the presence of the
testator be repealed was not accepted and the Statute of Wills of 1837 maintained
the requirement. See note 84, infra.
80. "We think the present law, which renders it unnecessary to state in the at-
testation that the forms required by the Statute were complied with, should not be
altered .. " SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 185.
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rendered otherwise subsequently.8 1
After rejecting both holographic and nuncupative wills as ex-
ceptions to the "general rule which would preponderate over the
benefits, ' 82 the Commission recommended the repeal of the pro-
visions of the Statute of Frauds pertaining to nuncupative wills. 83
All of these recommendations were incorporated in the Statute
of Wills of 1837. Section IX incorporated the recommendations of
two witnesses, that witnesses sign in the presence of each other
and that there be no form required for attestation. 84 The provi-
sions of the Statute of Frauds dealing with nuncupative wills
were repealed by Section 11.85 Section XIV provided that the
competency of witnesses would be determined at the time of exe-
cution.8 6
81. It appears to us to be expedient that wills should be required to be at-
tested by such witnesses as would be admitted, unless they subsequently
become incompetent, to give evidence respecting the execution of them.
We do not feel ourselves at liberty to suggest alterations in the general
rules of evidence, and see no sufficient reason for making the case of wills
an exception to those rules. These reasons induce us to propose, in con-
formity with the Statute of Frauds, that the witnesses should be required
to be credible persons, and that gifts to them should be void, according to
the provisions of the Statute. 25 Geo. 1, c.6.
Id. at 187.
82. Id. at 181.
83. We admit that in many of these cases the impossibility of making a
will must be attended with injury to the family of the testator; but in es-
tablishing any general rule it is impossible to prevent all cases of individ-
ual hardship, and if nuncupative or irregular wills were allowed in such
cases, the property of every person who died away from his family would
be liable to be fraudelently taken from them by the perjury of persons
who were, or might pretend to have been, near him at the time of his
death.
Id. at 182.
84. And it be further enacted, that no will shall be valid unless it shall be
in writing and executed in manner hereinafter mentioned; (that is to say),
it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by some
other person in his presence and by his direction; and such signature shall
be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more
witnesses present at the same time, and such witnesses shall attest and
shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of at-
testation shall be necessary.
Statute of Wills, 1837, 7 Will. 4 § 1 Vict., c. 26 § IX (1837).
85. "An act for prevention of frauds and perjuries, as relates ... to nuncupa-
tive wills, or to the repeal, altering, or changing of any will in writing concerning
any goods or chattels or personal estate, or any clause, devise, or bequest therein
... are hereby repealed..." Id. at § II.
86. And be it further enacted, that if any person who shall attest the exe-
cution of a will shall at the time of the execution thereof or at any time
afterwards be incompetent to be admitted a witness to prove the execu-
tion thereof, such will shall not on that account be invalid.
The Statute of Wills of 1837 constituted an enactment of the
practical effects of the Statute of Frauds; its provisions applied
equally to wills of both personalty and realty.87 Section XXIV
also brought the law in step with accepted custom by abrogating
the outmoded concept of a will as a conveyance, prevalent when
the first Statute of Wills was enacted, by providing that a will
would speak as of the time of the testator's death and would
thereby serve to pass all property acquired after its making.8
8
Other provisions of the Statute dealt with the competency of in-
terested witnesses, 89 a concept which survives in many states.
The reasons set forth for the Commission's recommendations
indicate that the Commission's primary concern was to create
practical formalities to assure adequate evidence would be avail-
able at the testator's death,90 while at the same time not unduly
burdening the courts with formalities which would only serve to
defeat true wills. 91 With the enactment of this statute, a shift in
emphasis from restrictions upon testation to formalities which are
designed to implement and facilitate testamentary intent be-
comes evident. The only mention of the prevention of fraud and
Id. at § XIV.
87. See note 67 supra.
88. And be it further enacted, that every will shall be construed with reference
to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if
it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a con-
trary intention shall appear by the will. Statute of Wills, 1837, 7 Will. 4 § 1 Vict., c.
26 § XXIV (1837).
89. And be it further enacted that if any person shall attest the execution
of any will to whom or to whose wife or husband any beneficial devise,
legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment, of or affecting any real or per-
sonal estate (other than the except charges and directions for the pay-
ment of any debt or debts), shall be thereby given or made, such devise,
legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment shall, so far only as concerns
such persons attesting the will, or the wife or husband of such person, or
any person claiming under such person or wife or husband, be utterly null
and void, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness to
prove the execution of such will, or to prove the validity or invalidity
thereof, notwithstanding such devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or ap-
pointment, mentioned in such will.
Id. at XV.
And be it further enacted, that in case by any will any real or personal es-
tate shall be charged with any debt or debts, or any creditor, or the wife or
husband of any creditor, whose debt is so charged, shall attest the execu-
tion of such will, such creditor notwithstanding such charge shall be ad-
mitted a witness to prove the execution of such will, or to prove the
validity or invalidity thereof.
Id. at XVI.
And be it further enacted, that no person shall, on account of his being an
executor of a will, be incompetent to be admitted a witness to prove the
execution of such will, or a witness to prove the validity or invalidity
thereof.
Id. at XVII.
90. See text following note 121 infra.
91. See note 79 supra.
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perjury as a realistic goal of the Statute was made when the Com-
mission discussed its reasons for recommending the nonrecogni-
tion of holographic and nuncupative wills. 92 Many states today
have statutes requiring formalities very close to, if not exactly the
same as, those required by the Statute of Wills of 1827. Like the
Commissioners, courts and legislators generally recognize that
the purpose of these formalities is to serve an evidentiary func-
tion.
A General Survey of American Statutes
Today every state in the union and the District of Columbia
have statutes 93 requiring essentially the same formalities as the
Statute of Wills of 1837:
(1) A writing;
(2) Subscription by testator;
(3) Subscription by witnesses;
(4) Two witnesses;
(5) That the testator sign or acknowledge his signature in the presence
of both witnesses at the same time.
94
92. SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 181-82.
93. ALA. CODE tit. 43, § 1-30 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.155 (1972); ARiz. REV.
STAT. § 14-2502 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-403 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (West
1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-161 (Supp. 1978);
DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 202 (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 18-103 (1967); FLA. STAT. § 732.502
(Supp. 1978); GA. CODE § 113-301 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 536-3 (1968); IDAHO
CODE § 15-2-502 (Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 3, § 43 (1961); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3
(Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE § 633.279 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 59-606 (1964); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 394.040 (Supp. 1978); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1584 (West 1952); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 4, § 102 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 191 § 1 (West Supp. 1978); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 27.3178 (Supp. 1978);
MINN. STAT. Am. § 524.2-502 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1973); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 474.320 (1956); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2327 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.040
(1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30. 1-80-02 (Special Supp.
1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551.2 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-4 (West Supp.
1978); NM. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-4 (1954); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUST LAW § 3-2.1 (Mc-
Kinney SuPp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 55 (West 1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.235 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2502 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-5-5 (1970); S.C. CODE § 21-7-50 (1977); S.D.
UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 29-2-6 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-104 (1977); TEX. PROB.
CODE Am. § 59 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 5 (1974); VA. CODE § 64.1-49 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.020
(1967); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1966); WiSC. STAT. § 853.03 (1971); WYO. STAT. § 2-4-104
(1971).
94. Whether these state statutes have been fashioned after the Statute of
Frauds or the Statute of Wills of 1837 is of little significance in view of the fact that
the Statute of Wills of 1837, at the time of its enactment, was considered an
amendment to the then existing law governing wills, which was, essentially, the
Statute of Frauds. See note 67 supra. Although Louisiana's law is fashioned after
the Civil Law, its will formalities are closely aligned with those states following
All states require a writing, signed by the testator and either two
or three95 witnesses.
Variations upon the Statute of Wills relate to the remaining re-
quirements. Only eleven states require that the testator sub-
scribe the will 96 and only twenty-three states require subscribing
witnesses. 97 Twenty-eight states require the witnesses to sign in
the presence of the testator,98 and thirteen of those additionally
require the witnesses to sign in the presence of each other.99 Six
states require a declaration by the testator that the writing is his
will. 00
These last two variations, unlike the others, add to the original
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The requirement that the
witnessses sign in the presence of each other serves essentially
the same function as the Statute of Wills requirement that the
testator sign in the presence of both witnesses at the same time,
to avoid the ease of forgery and fraud possible when only one
other person is required to be present.101 It should be noted that
the common law. Louisiana, however, requires superscription on a sealed will as
opposed to subscription. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1584 (West 1952). See also BOWE
& PARKER, supra note 5, at § 19.2.
95. Louisiana, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Vermont require three
witnesses. See note 93 supra.
96. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota require the testator to sub-
scribe the will. Id.
97. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Texas, Rhode Island and Vermont require subscribing witnesses. Id.
98. California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin re-
quire the witnesses to sign in the presence of the testator. Id.
99. California, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New
Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin re-
quire witnesses to sign in both the presence of the testator and each other. Id.
100. Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, and South Dakota require
the testator to declare the writing to be his will. Id.
101. We have seen that, for the due execution of a will according to the
Statute of Frauds, it is not requisite that the witnesses should attest in the
presence of each other, or that one should be seen by another. It is suffi-
cient if the testator acknowledge his signature, or his will, at three several
times to different witnesses. It is evident that this construction, which has
been regretted by several eminent judges, militates against the object of
the Statute, and that great additional security against forgery and fraud is
obtained by requiring that the witnesses should be present at one time.
In case of forgery, it is easier to get two accomplices at different times,
than both together. It is important that the competency of the testator at
the time of the execution of his will should be satisfactorily established;
and if the transaction must be witnessed by both witnesses at one time,
they must then agree in the same story, and perjury will be more easily
detected by cross-examination.
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the Real Property Committee recommended that the witnesses
sign in the presence of each other.0 2 This recommendation was
not incorporated in the Statute of Wills of 1837.103 No statutes ex-
pressly require both witnesses to be present at the same time
when the testator signs or acknowledges the will. The require-
ment of a declaration bears no relation to the Statute of Wills of
1837.
Nine states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.).104
The U.P.C. does not require attestation, although it does require
witnessing of either the testator's signature or acknowledgment
thereof. 0 5 Given the meaning of attestation,10 the absence of
this requirement in the U.P.C. is of little significance.
Nine states have statutes providing for self-proved wills.107
Self-proved wills may be admitted to probate without the testi-
mony of subscribing witnesses. Such statutes, in addition to the
usual formalities, require affidavits of the witnesses be attached
to the will before a designated official and evidenced by his seal.
II. FORMALITIES CONSIDERED FROM A FUNCTIONAL STANDPOINT
Having reviewed the history of formalities requirements and,
thus, the progression of law to the present tension in the courts,
the following query seems appropriate: what are the goals to be
achieved by formalities requirements and how will they facilitate
the accomplishment of those goals? To the extent that it is be-
lieved that something must be measureable or that the testator
SUGDEN, supra note 68, at 184.
102. See note 79 supra.
103. See note 84 supra.
104. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Utah. The Uniform Probate Code was enacted by South Dakota, but
later repealed; it is no longer effective there. See note 93 supra.
105. Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within Section 2-513,
and wills within Section 2-506, every will shall be in writing signed by the
testator or in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's
presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at least 2 persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing of the testator's acknowledge-
ment of the signature or of the will.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
106. BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 163 (4th ed. 1968).
107. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2504 (1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-11-504 (Supp. 1978);
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-504 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-2 (1972); IOWA CODE
§ 633.279 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-504 (West 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 133.050 (1973); N.M. STATE. ANN. § 30-2-8.2 (Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84,
§ 55 (West 1970).
can be forced to take some desired action by imposing a require-
ment, there is ample justification for a relevant formality. On the
other hand, to the extent that an action cannot be forced upon a
testator or measured by a presently existing or proposed formal-
ity, the implementation of such a formality or its retention would
be a formalism adding to the tension between courts and testa-
tors.
There are several goals that can be stated, although the list may
not be exclusive:
(1) That the testator has thought seriously about the nature and value
of his property, those who have natural claims upon the testator for sup-
port, and how those claims can be satisfied;
(2) That the testator reached a final decision on the disposition of the
assets. Although it is not necessary that the testator make complete dis-
position, it is desirable that the testator's state of mind be final on the dis-
position made in the will;
(3) That the testator's decision, when made, be free of excessive influ-
ence by others. Although it is recognized that testators are inherently in-
fluenced by all that surrounds them, the testator should weigh those
influences against his or her own values and come to an independent deci-
sion;
(4) That there be a record of the scheme of disposition which is free
from alteration or substitution by others;
(5) That the testator's choices be expressed in language and form
which enables the implementation of those choices on a routine basis.
Gulliver and Tilson have suggested that these goals can be ex-
pressed as functional purposes of the Statute of Wills, serving a
ritual function, an evidentiary function and a protective func-
tion.1 08 Professor Langbein has added a fourth function which he
calls the channeling function. 109 Accepting the classifications for
purposes of discussion, an examination can be made to determine
the extent to which current formalities serve the function of
achieving the above mentioned goals.
The Ritual Function
"Compliance with the total combination of requirements for the
execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value, since
the general ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator
was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion."110 It is perhaps true
that facing the reality of death and its attendant consequences is
one of the most difficult responsibilities in life.1 1 ' While the con-
108. Gulliver, supra note 1.
109. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With The Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489,
493 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Langbein].
110. Gulliver, supra note 1, at 5.
111. For an excellent discussion of the psychology of confronting death as part
of the estate planning process, see Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young Family Clients
and the Psychology of Testation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345 (1969) and Shaffer,
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sequences of death are inherently the focus of the execution of a
will, a will is normally executed at a time when death is not immi-
nent. Coupled with the fact that normally the testator does not
part with the least incident of ownership upon execution of the
will, such execution may not achieve the goal of careful consider-
ation of property and obligations. The process of ritual or cere-
mony is thought to assure that the testator is aware of the
solemnity of the act and its attendant consequences. It is, of
course, true that ritual or ceremony cannot guarantee such aware-
ness. A testator whose mind is set to accomplish some deviant
purpose may nevertheless choose testamentary ritual for that
purpose without intending its normal consequences.11 2
There are perhaps three principal formalities that provide rit-
ual. The first is the requirement that wills be in writing. Writing
has always been regarded as the most solemn form of expression
and is far less susceptible to a claim that it was tentative instead
of final. 113 The requirement of writing cannot, of course, assure
the desired degree of solemnity. Holographic wills, though re-
quired to be in writing, are often cast in very conversational tones
which have the reader wondering whether the expression was
nothing more than a segment of the writer's "stream of conscious-
ness" instead of a finalized act." 4
The second formality which purports to promote solemnity is
that of a signature. A signature is, of course, a sign of authenticity
and, when placed at the end of the writing as required by most
wills' acts, also imparts a sense of completeness. 15 It says, in es-
The "Estate Planning" Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IowA L. REV.
376 (1969).
112. The requirement is that there be actual, as opposed to stated, testamen-
tary intent. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, at § 5.10. The most obvious example of
deviant purpose is the so-called "sham will" cases. The leading case is Lister v.
Smith, 3 Sw. & Tr. 280, 164 Eng. Rep. 1282 (1864), wherein a testator was shown to
have executed a codicil to induce a member of his family to surrender a house
which she then occupied. Evidence of the absence of testamentary intent caused
the untimely demise of the codicil. Accord: In re Estate of Siemers, 202 Cal. 424,
266 P.298 (1927).
113. This is, of course, the principal thrust of the Statute of Frauds. See text
accompanying note 44, supra.
114. One of the great examples of such conversational "stream of conscious-
ness" appears in Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 123 A. 405 (1924), where the se-
quence of presentation was advice on how to pickle pork, ruminations of the cold
winter and a short statement of disposition of property "if ennything [sic] hap-
pens". See also Estate of Devlin, 198 Cal. 721, 247 P. 577 (1926).
115. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5 at §19.57. See also Estate of Manchester, 174
Cal. 417, 163 P.358 (1917).
sence, "this is my act and I have completed it." Holographic will
statutes do not generally require that the signature be placed at
the end of the will.116 Although a signature, wherever placed,
may declare the authenticity of the document,"17 authenticity will
probably already have been guaranteed in the holograph by the
requirement that it be completely in the handwriting of the testa-
tor. The failure to require that the signature be at the end of the
will raises two significant problems. The first is whether it was, in
fact, placed elsewhere on the document as an authentication. The
second is whether the document is complete or whether it has
been left open-ended or incomplete. 118 Courts have been called
upon to use a fiction of adoption of a prior signature where later
provisions were added to a holographic will.119 The litigation
which has occurred over the failure to require that the signature
be at the end is indicative of its function as a formality.
It may, of course, be true that the solemnity of a writing and a
signature do not forever fix the testator's intent. Intent is fluid as
a part of ongoing thought processes; however, it is presumed that
if the testator's intent does not change to the point where he is
motivated to revise the written instrument, the change is tenta-
tive and does not deserve solemn recognition.
The third formality which promotes solemnity is that of declara-
tion or publication of the instrument as the testator's will or testa-
ment and the attendant witnessing of that act. It is interesting to
116. In those states where holographic wills are authorized by the general stat-
ute on execution of wills, the usual requirement is that the signature must be
placed in the same position as that required for all other wills. BOWE & PARKER,
supra note 5, at § 20.8. This appears to be limited to Arkansas, Kentucy, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Of these states, the Ar-
kansas, Kentucky and Mississippi statutes require subscription. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§60-403 (1971) and KY. REv. STAT. §394.040 (1972). But see Smith v. MacDonald, 252
Ark. 931, 401 S.W.2d 741 (1972). MIss. CODE ANN. 391-5-1 (1973). The North Caro-
lina, Virginia and West Virginia statutes require that the will be signed in a man-
ner which makes it manifest that it was intended as an executing signature. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 3.1-3.4 (1976); VA. CODE § 64.1-49 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1966).
The Texas Probate Code simply requires a signature. Vernon's TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1956).
117. The approach of the courts is amply stated in Estate of Manchester supra
note 115, at 421, where the court, in discussing a holographic will, said:
The true rule, as we conceive it to be, is that, wherever placed, the fact
that it was intended as an executing signature must satisfactorily appear
on the document itself. If it is at the end of the document, the universal
custom of mankind forces the conclusion that it was appended as an exe-
cution, if nothing to the contrary appears.
118. An excellent example of the apparent incompleteness of a probate will
may be found in Estate of Devlin, supra note 114.
119. BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5 at §20.9. See also In re Glass, 165 Cal. App.
2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958); Campbell v. Henley, 172 Tenn. 135, 110 S.W.2d 329
(1937).
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note, however, that few states still require publication, 120 prefer-
ring instead to rely upon authentication by signature or acknowl-
edgement of signature. If the signature is required to be at the
end of the instrument it would seem that publication is a formal-
ism that is unnecessary. The completion of the act in the pres-
ence of witnesses definitely adds formality to the ceremony and
prevents the testator from regarding the act as whimisical or ca-
pricious. It is believed that the sum and substance of these for-
malities is that few persons could realistically avoid the
conclusion that this is a solemn act which will have significant
consequences.
The Evidentiary Function
In the Statute of Frauds of 1677, the act is entitled "An Act for
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes."'12 1 All wills' acts have as a
primary function the providing of evidence from which the court
can, with certainty, ascertain the testator's wishes. Writing as-
sures a more permanent form. The signature authenticates the
document as being that of the testator. The requirement that the
signature be at the end with subsequent attestation assures com-
pleteness, prevents interpolation, and infers finality. The require-
ment of witnesses provides testimony as to the act of testation,
and the requirement that the witnesses be disinterested is meant
to eliminate self-serving testimony. It cannot be said with cer-
tainty that these goals will be achieved by the requirements of
such formalities. Interpolation of a signed and witnessed will is
not impossible since there is no requirement that the testator
sign every page and there is certainly no requirement that the
witnesses know what is in the instrument. The fact that they pro-
mote achievement of the goals is, however, sufficient to warrant
their inclusion in the statute.
Holographic instruments are perhaps the best form of evidence
since they are required to be wholly in the handwriting of the tes-
tator. Indeed, Gulliver and Tilson believe they are justifiable only
from an evidentiary standpoint.122 However, the premise that
genuineness of handwriting is justification for the holographic
form is highly suspect. The holographic will is exempted from
120. See note 100 supra.
121. See note 113 supra.
122. Gulliver, supra note 1, at 13.
most of the formalities which are designed to achieve the desira-
ble goals. The Uniform Probate Code, however, has not only per-
petuated the holograph as a desirable form of expressing intent
but has facilitated its use by lowering the evidentiary require-
ments by providing that only the "material provisions" of the will
need be in the handwriting of the testator.123
The Protective Function
The requirements that the testator publish and declare the will
to disinterested witnesses and that they attest in the testator's
presence and in the presence of each other are meant to protect
the testator from imposition at the time of execution.124 Function-
ally, the presence of multiple parties acts as a check against impo-
sition by third parties and by parties present at the signing of the
will. It is here, however, that the formalities requirements may
have failed to live up to their purposes. While fraud may be prac-
ticed at the time of execution of the will,125 undue influence usu-
ally occurs over a much longer period of time.126 Inherently,
therefore, the fact that witnesses are disinterested or that they at-
test in the presence of each other is little safeguard against impo-
sition. On the other hand, failure to adhere to the formality can
result in the will being disallowed probate even where the court is
satisfied that no fraud or undue influence has occurred. 127
The courts have recognized that these formalities are overly
harsh. The requirement that witnesses attest in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each other has often been in-
terpreted as meaning "in the conscious presence." "Conscious
presence" generally means that though the witness may be out of
the testator's senses of hearing or sight, they are where the testa-
tor could see or hear them if he wished to make the effort to do
SO.128
The requirement that witnesses be disinterested has been soft-
ened in some jurisdictions by saying that a witness must be disin-
terested at the time of his testimony by giving up his gift under
123. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
124. Gulliver, supra note 1, at 9.
125. See Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W. 2d 559 (1948) where the testatrix
was forcibly prevented from executing her will.
126. See In re Kaufmann's Will, 20 App. Div. 2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964) ajfd
15 N.Y.2d 825, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941, 205 N.E.2d 864 (1965); Hutton, Undue Influence and
Fraud in Wills, 37 DICK. L. REV. 16 (1932); Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and
Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176 (1943).
127. In re Groffman, 1 W.L.R. 733 (1968); Gulliver, supra note 1, at 9-13.
128. BowE & PARKER, supra note 5 § 19.125; Glenn v. Mann, 234 Ga. 194, 214
S.E.2d 911 (1975); Estate of Tracy, 80 Cal. App. 2d 782, 182 P.2d 336 (1947).
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the will.129 It would seem that such lack of interest at the time
the will is probated will have little prophylactic value on imposi-
tion at the time of making the will.
Since fraud and undue influence have usually been brought to
bear upon the testator prior to the execution of the will, it seems
that the continuation of the requirements that the witnesses at-
test in the presence of each other and that the witnesses be disin-
terested are unnecessarily formalistic and should not be
continued. Fraud and undue influence are usually the results of
objective acts which may be proven at probate and which do not
usually require the testator's presence..
The Channeling Function
Professor Langbein had added this additional function to the
three originally described by Gulliver and Tilson.130 Essentially it
says that it is important to put wills into recognizable forms in or-
der to minimize the time and effort required to ascertain their
purpose. Presumably, the more an instrument looks like a will
and speaks like a will, the less likely it is that litigation will result
with consequent depletion of the estate and prolonged or delayed
distribution. To the extent that formalities force a will into a set
form, they have served a function of effecting a routine transmis-
sion of wealth. However, the critical factor is not whether the tes-
tator created something which looked like a will, but whether the
language of the transmission was adequate to express the testa-
tor's intent. Formalities, as they are presently structured, do not
prescribe language of transmission, but only the requirements
surrounding execution.
Although they may add to the burden of family wealth trans-
mission,131 the formalities requirements of the Statute of Wills,
with the exceptions previously noted, are important to the integ-
rity of the will and to its implementation. In the past few years,
however, there has been increasing concern over the fact that the
129. State of Frauds, 1752, 25 Geo. 2, c. 6 § 1 (1752); BOWE & PARKER, supra note
5 at § 19.102; In re Lee, 225 Cal. App. 2d 578, 37 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1964). See also Com-
ment, The Prohibition Against Interested Witnesses Taking Under the Will, 9 Hous.
L. REV. 1078 (1972).
130. Langbein supra note 109, at 493-94.
131. While burdens upon the process are not to be taken lightly, we do not be-
lieve that the process can be unburdened by minimizing formalities as has been
done in the Uniform Probate Code. See Comment to UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-
503.
failure to follow formalities requirements will normally result in
the will failing in its entirety. 3 2 Several attempts to ameliorate
such harshness have been suggested.
III. REDUCING THE TENSION OF FORMALITIES
The two most significant attempts to reduce the tension created
by formalities requirements are the Uniform Probate Code133 and
the proposal to implement the substantial compliance doctrine.I3 4
The U.P.C., in Section 2-502, states the requirements for execu-
tion of a non-holographic will to be as follows:
[e very will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's
name by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direc-
tion, and shall be signed by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed ei-
ther the signing or the testator's acknowledgement of the signature or of
the will.
The general comment to Part 5 of the U.P.C. makes clear that the
overriding purpose of the statute was to minimize requirements
for execution in order to validate wills wherever possible. 35
While simplicity of execution is important, it seems that the proc-
ess of minimizing formalities has significantly reduced the func-
tional ability in at least two significant respects. There is no
requirement that the signature be at the end of the document. 36
This is important to prevent the type of litigation produced by ho-
lographic wills in states such as California.137 It is also important
as a demonstration of completeness and finality of intent.
Section 2-503 of the U.P.C. should not have reduced the require-
ment that holographic wills be entirely in the handwriting of the
testator.' 38 The result is that the principal justification for ho-
lographic wills, i.e., their evidentiary value, has been seriously im-
paired. Holographic wills, since they are often cast in informal
language which leaves in doubt their completeness and finality,
132. The justifications used by the courts for such harsh treatment are amply
discussed by Professor Langbein, supra note 109, at 499-503.
133. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-501, 2-506.
134. Langbein, supra note 109.
135. Uniform Probate Code, Part 5, General Comment: Part 5 of Article II deals
with capacity and formalities for execution and revocation of wills. "If the will is
to be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth at
death, its execution must be kept simple. The basic intent of these sections is to
validate the will whenever possible. To this end, the age for making wills is low-
ered to eighteen, formalities for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum
136. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
137. Estate of Manchester, supra note 115, Estate of Leonard, 1 Cal. 2d 8, 32 P.2d
603 (1934); Estate of Devlin, supra note 114; Estate of Kinney, 16 Cal. 2d 50, 104
P.2d 782 (1940); Estate of Bloch, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952).
138. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
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should likewise be required to have an executing signature at the
end of the document.
The value of the U.P.C. approach is that its statutory language
gives predictability to a testamentary act. The ability to predict
the outcome of one's actions is, of course, a paramount function of
the law. Its difficulty lies in the fact that it leaves in doubt a prin-
cipal question of the state of the testator's mind with regard to
disposition. That completeness and finality of intent can be judi-
cially determined from an inspection of the language at probate is
not sufficient since one of the goals is routine processing of testa-
mentary instruments. Since most written wills are drawn by at-
torneys, the burden on the testator is not onerous.
The argument in favor of the implementation of the substantial
compliance doctrine is that, while it lacks the predictability of the
U.P.C., it does insist upon a higher degree of formality yet with
the understanding that where the failure to comply with any for-
mality is shown, proof may be received to demonstrate that the
function of the formality has still been met. 139 There is something
inherently fair about an approach which says that formalities are
important but they are a tool and not a sword. If the result has
been achieved without the tool, then the tool becomes unimpor-
tant. The problem is that wills are unlike the world of contracts
where the demands of business often necessitate informality
which does not rise to the level contemplated by the Statute of
Frauds. Wills are more often made without such demands of time
pressure. The testator has every opportunity to comply with for-
mality requirements. And it is inherently true that the will's im-
plementation will preclude testimony by the already deceased
testator.
A second problem is the ambiguity of "substantial compliance."
Does it mean that whenever the previously set forth goals have
been met, we then have substantial compliance?' 40 Does it mean
that some formalities are more important than others and that
substantial compliance involves completion of only the important
formalities?141 If the former, then the statute governing execution
139. Langbein, supra note 109, at 513.
140. There is some indication that this is the purposive inquiry of the doctrine.
Langbein says "The substantial compliance doctrine would permit the proponents
in cases of defective execution to prove what they are now entitled to presume
from due execution ... the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment of
the Wills Act purposes." Id.
141. That some formalities could not be excused is apparent. "The substantial
of wills ought to be framed in such a way as to inform the poten-
tial testator of the objective to be achieved and how to best go
about it. If the latter, then would there not be a reversion back to
the more parochial situation where judicial decision-making
leaves a wide discrepancy between courts as to what is important
and what is less important? With an increasingly mobile society
such discrepancy would seem to be something to be discouraged.
On the whole, therefore, while implementation of the substan-
tial compliance doctrine is favored it is believed that the interests
of testators will generally be better served by a statute which re-
quires those formalities which are important to achievement of
the stated goals. Such a statute gives predictability to the conse-
quences of a testator's proposed cause of action. When coupled
with an interpretive approach designed to validate the will wher-
ever possible, the statute will significantly reduce the tension cre-
ated by formalities requirments which are viewed in a strict
sense. Therefore, the following statute is proposed:
Execution of Wills. Every will shall be in writing and shall be executed as
follows:
(1) It must be signed at the end thereof by the testator or in the testa-
tor's name by some other person in the testator's presence and by
his direction. A person who signs the testator's name, by his direc-
tion, should sign his own name to the will but a failure to do so will
not, of itself, invalidate the will.
(2) It must be signed by at least two persons, each of whom witnessed
either the signing of the will or the testator's acknowledgement of
the signature or declaration that the instrument is his will.
General Comment
The formalities requirements set forth in the statute are intended to facili-
tate a determination that the testator has reached a final decision concern-
ing disposition of part or all of his or her estate, to preserve as accurate a
record of that decision as possible, and to provide testimony to the imple-
mentation of that decision wherever possible. The statutory requirements
are to be interpreted in such a way as to implement those goals and the
court may, in the situation where it is satisfied that those goals have been
met, admit a will to probate even though literal compliance with the re-
quirements may be lacking.
IV. SUMMARY
Although the history of formalities requirements has been a
struggle to free ourselves from the restraints upon alienation im-
posed by feudal policy, there are positive goals to be achieved by
utilization of such formalities in the wealth transmission process.
It is our attitude toward those formalities which, in the end, cre-
ates the burdensome tension between private ownership and re-
compliance doctrine would virtually always follow present law in holding that an
unsigned will is no will; a will with the testator's signature omitted does not com-
ply substantially with the Wills Act because it leaves in doubt all the issues on
which the proponents bear the burden of proof ... Id. at 518.
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strictions upon disposition. To the extent that formalities can be
perceived or approached from a perspective of achieving the tes-
tator's goals or assisting the implementation of the testator's
choices, the tension will have been significantly reduced.

